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In South Africa power is exercised simultaneously by all spheres of government.1 
Consequently provision is made for the constitutional principles of cooperative 
government to coordinate government functions and intergovernmental supervision. 
Given the interdependence, distinctiveness and interrelatedness of spheres of 
government,2 intergovernmental supervision is essential to preserve the unity of the 
Republic, but could also be prejudicial to the autonomy of the spheres. Although this 
article explores both views of intergovernmental supervisory powers, it is not an 
exhaustive discussion. Intergovernmental dispute resolution, established under the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (IGRFA)3 and the mechanism 
established by the Constitution to review intergovernmental supervisory powers are 
also assessed.  The article concludes with proposals for improvement. 
2  Intergovernmental supervision 
Intergovernmental supervision is conducted with the understanding that the 
Constitution affords equality and autonomy to each sphere of government.4 It 
includes monitoring of, intervention in and support of one sphere of government by 
                                                          
* This paper was presented at the Society of Law Teachers of Southern Africa Conference in Durban, 
South Africa, on 6-9June 2016 
1  Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the 
Constitution) distribute government powers to all spheres of government. 
2  Section 40 (1) of the Constitution provides that the national, provincial and local sphere of 
government are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. Steytler and De Visser in Local 
Government Law (2007) ch 16:3 define distinctiveness as the autonomy that the spheres have in 
respect of their powers and functions, interrelatedness as the relationship between the three 
spheres of government, and interdependence as their dependence on one another. 
3     Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005. 
4 Bekink Local Government Law (2005) 64; Meyer Local Government Law (1997) 6; Steytler and De 
Visser Local Government Law (2007) ch 16:13. 
2 
 
another.5 Although the Constitution allocates powers to all the spheres, the national 
government has the responsibility to establish a framework within which they 
exercise such powers and supervises this process.6 Therefore the national executive 
has the authority to intervene in a provincial executive when a province cannot or 
does not fulfil its executive obligation in terms of the Constitution or legislation.7 The 
purpose is to help the provincial executive to fulfil its obligations by taking any 
appropriate steps, including issuing directives describing the extent to which a 
province has failed to fulfil its obligations and the steps that ought to be taken to 
meet the obligation,8 as well as assuming responsibility for the relevant obligations of 
the provincial executive.9  
National government also has the authority to ensure that municipalities 
effectively exercise their powers as listed in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution.10 
Therefore the national executive is also required to intervene if the provincial 
government fails to exercise its powers of intervention in a municipality adequately.11 
Thus, national government supervises both provincial and local governments. 
In turn provincial government monitors and supports local government through 
legislative and other provincial measures.12 Just like the national government, 
provincial government is required to oversee the effective performance by 
municipalities in respect of matters listed in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution13 
and may intervene if a municipality fails to fulfil an executive obligation in terms of 
the Constitution or legislation,14 for instance, if it fails to approve a budget or 
revenue-raising measures necessary to give effect to the budget,15 or if the 
municipality fails to provide basic services as a result of crisis in its financial affairs.16 
                                                          
5 Mathenjwa “Contemporary trends in provincial government supervision of local government in South 
Africa” 18 (2014) LDD 181 in discussing the scope of provincial government supervision of local 
government points out that it is broader under the 1996 Constitution. 
6  In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) 239 
it was held that the allocation of supervisory powers to the national government is necessary  for 
South Africa to act as a single entity. 
7  s 100 (1) of the Constitution. 
8  s 100 (1) (a) of the Constitution. 
9  s 100 (1) (b) of the Constitution. 
10  s 155 (7) of the Constitution. 
11  s 139 (7) of the Constitution. 
12  s 155 (6) (a) of the Constitution. 
13  s 155 (7) of the Constitution. 
14  s 139 (1) of the Constitution.  
15  s 139 (4) of the Constitution. 
16  s 139 (5) of the Constitution. 
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Murray points out that the Constitution tasks government with social and economic 
development and therefore intergovernmental supervision is required to curb foot-
dragging by spheres of government that are not committed to these goals.17 
However, the history of intergovernmental supervision in 20 years of democratic 
government shows both advantages and disadvantages. 
3  Pros of intergovernmental supervision 
The Constitution provides principles of cooperative government to minimise disputes 
among the various spheres of government in the Republic.18 These constitutional 
principles direct all spheres of government to preserve the national unity and 
indivisibility of the Republic, secure the wellbeing of its people and provide effective, 
transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole.19 
Accordingly, intergovernmental supervision is essential to ensure that all spheres of 
government achieve this goal. 
3.1   Indivisibility of the Republic of South Africa 
The Republic of South Africa is one sovereign state.20 All spheres of government and 
organs of state are required to preserve the national unity and indivisibility of the 
Republic.21 The Oxford South African Concise Dictionary defines “indivisibility” as 
meaning “unable to be divided or separated”.22 According to Bartelsman indivisibility 
distinguishes sovereign authority from other forms of political power. Thus, 
indivisibility of sovereignty is a necessary condition of the unity of the state.23 
Furthermore the notion of indivisibility requires regional structures to account for the 
unity of the state and fosters the continuity of such a unity in time and space and its 
ability to withstand political change.24 
                                                          
17 Murray “Municipal integrity and effective government: the Butterworths intervention” 1999 SAPL 
333. 
18  s 41 of the Constitution. 
19  s 41 (1) (a)-(c) of the Constitution. See further Mathenjwa “The constitutional obligations imposed 
on a provincial government on instances where a municipality cannot provide basic services as a 
result of a crisis in its financial affairs” (1) 2015 TSAR 61 on the principles of cooperative 
government. 
20   s 1 of the Constitution. 
21   s 41 (1) (a) of the Constitution. 
22  Oxford South African Concise Dictionary (2010) 594. 
23  Bartelsman “The indivisibility of sovereignty”  (2011) 2 Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politica 
and the Arts 85. 
24  Bartelsman 87. 
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Therefore the various spheres of government and organs of state have a duty 
to provide coherent government, maintaining national security, economic unity, and 
minimum standards for the rendering of services and to ensure that they do not take 
any action that could prejudice another sphere.25 In a practical sense the question of 
the indivisibility of the Republic of South Africa was emphasised indirectly by 
Certification of the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution 1996.26 Here the provincial legislature 
of KwaZulu-Natal drafted a provincial constitution that regulated the status of the 
province as self-governing within the Republic. When this constitution was referred 
to the Constitutional Court for certification, the court rejected it, because it was 
beyond the capacity of a provincial legislature to pass constitutional provisions 
concerning the status of a province within the Republic.27 This judgment reinforces 
the indivisibility of the Republic by clarifying that in South Africa only the Constitution 
of the Republic regulates the status of the spheres of government. In Speaker of the 
National Assembly: In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the National Education Policy Bill,28 the court differentiated the 
sovereignty of South Africa from that of the United States of America (USA). It held 
that “unlike in the USA, the provinces in South Africa are not sovereign states. They 
were created by the Constitution and have only those powers that are specifically 
conferred on them under the Constitution”.29 In the USA powers vest in state 
governments and the federal government exercises only those powers allocated to it 
by the constitution of the federal Republic of the USA.30 Consequently, 
intergovernmental supervision is necessary to prevent disintegration in government 
structures. 
 
                                                          
25 This view is reinforced by the power of the national parliament in terms of section 44 (2) of the 
Constitution to intervene and legislate in the competence area of the provincial legislature if 
necessary to maintain national security, economic unity, essential national standards, to establish 
minimum standards required for the rendering of services or to prevent unreasonable action taken 
by a province which is prejudicial to interests of another province or the country as a whole; 
furthermore section 139 (1) (b) permits provincial government to intervene in a municipality to the 
extent necessary to maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum standards 
for rendering a service or to prevent the municipal council from taking unreasonable action that is 
prejudicial to the interests of another municipality or the province as a whole, or to maintain 
economic unity. 
26   Certification of the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution 1996 1996 (11) BCLR 1419. 
27   See the Certification of the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution 15. 
28  Ex Parte Speaker of the National Assembly: In re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of   
Certain Provisions of the National Education Bill of 1996 1996 (3) SA 289 (CC). 
29   Ex Parte Speaker of the National Assembly 23. 
30   Ex Parte Speaker of the National Assembly 23. 
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3.2  Good governance 
The spheres of government and organs of state are required to provide effective, 
transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole.31 
The Constitution envisages that the different spheres of government will provide 
good governance for the people. Mbao and Komboni correctly point out that there is 
no universally accepted definition of “governance” but the term is mainly used to 
refer to the way that a country is governed and how a nation’s affairs are 
conducted.32 Hatchard, Ndulo and Slinn further point out that good governance 
implies “conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the 
legitimacy of the public realm”.33 The values and principles of good governance 
include efficiency, accountability and transparency.34 
Intergovernmental supervision is essential to ensure that all spheres of 
government exercise their powers to accomplish good governance. This is evident in 
the case of MEC for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs KwaZulu-Natal 
v Imbabazane Municipality.35 Here the respondent was employed as a municipal 
manager in terms of the Municipal Structures Act, which stipulates that the 
employment contract for a municipal manager should be for a fixed term of 
employment up to a maximum of five years, but not exceeding a period ending one 
year after the election of the next council of the municipality.36 The employment 
contract of the respondent by operation of law expired on 18 May 2012, one year 
from the date when the local government elections were held in 2011.37 Despite 
expiry of the contract the respondent continued to occupy the position. The MEC 
succeeded in obtaining a court order declaring the contract of employment of the  
respondent null and void after 18 May 2012.38 
                                                          
31    s 41 (1) (c) of the Constitution. 
32 Mbao and Komboni “Promotion of good governance and combating corruption and 
maladministration: the case of Botswana” (2008) 12  LDD 50. 
33 Hatchard, Ndulo and Slinn Comparative Good Governance in the Common Wealth (2004) 2. 
34   s 195 (1) of the Constitution. 
35 MEC for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs v Imbabazane Municipality case no 
5238/12  (KZPHC) ( unreported) . 
36   s 54 A of Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 118 of 1998. 
37  Imbabazane Municipality case 20. 
38  Imbabazane Municipality case 52. 
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In the case of Dakolo v Mokhatla,39 the executive mayor of the Southern 
District Municipality used his cell phone allowance far beyond the limitation 
prescribed. This abuse was picked up by the Auditor-General who voiced his 
dissatisfaction. Instead of settling the debt the mayor came to an agreement with the 
council to write off the funds.40 The Auditor-General, being unsatisfied with the 
agreement, summoned the mayor to appear before the North West Provincial 
Accounts Standing Committee. Although this case deals with the privileges of a 
municipal council, it is relevant to show the importance of intergovernmental 
supervision. In this case the mayor was made to account for the abuse of 
government resources before the provincial government. Consequently, 
intergovernmental supervision was used to curb corruption in the local sphere of 
government. 
The issue of poor governance arose in Member of the Executive Council of 
the Eastern Cape Responsible for Local Government and Traditional Affairs v 
Inkwanca Local Municipality.41 Community dissatisfaction with service delivery and 
irregularities at the municipality prompted the MEC to institute a forensic 
investigation, which revealed irregularities to be addressed.42 Despite several 
requests from the MEC that the municipality act upon the issues raised in the 
forensic report, the council failed to do so. The MEC then obtained a court order 
instructing the council to convene and consider the issues.43 Accordingly 
intergovernmental supervision helped arrest a lack of service delivery in local 
government. 
3.3   Wellbeing of the people of the Republic 
 All spheres of government and organs of state should secure the wellbeing of the 
people of the Republic.44 The phrase “wellbeing” is not defined in the Constitution. 
The Oxford Concise English Dictionary defines “wellbeing” as the state of being 
comfortable, healthy or happy.45 This could also be ascertained from reading the 
                                                          
39  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (C C). 
40  Dikoko case 5. 
41 Member of Executive Council of the Eastern Cape Responsible for Local Government and 
Traditional Affairs v Inkwanca Local Municipality case no1246/14 (ECGHC) (unreported) 82 . 
42  Inkwanca Local Municipality case 20. 
43  Inkwanca  Municipality case 64. 
44   s 41 (1) (b) of the Constitution. 
45  Oxford Concise English dictionary (2001) 1625. 
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Constitution holistically. The preamble shows that “wellbeing” implies for instance the 
attainment of social justice and improvement of the quality of life for everyone.46 The 
Constitution is explicit in guaranteeing the wellbeing of the people: the inherent 
dignity of all and the right to have their dignity respected, an environment that is not 
harmful to their health or wellbeing, access to adequate housing, health care 
services, including reproductive health care, sufficient food and water, social 
security, and the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care and other social 
services.47 
The responsibility of realising the wellbeing of the people is entrusted 
concurrently to all spheres of government. Hence the spheres must supervise one 
another to ensure that none drags its feet. This view is supported by the Grootboom 
judgment where, in explaining the right of access to housing, it was held that each 
sphere of government accept responsibility for the provision of housing.48 The 
judgment reflects the need for the spheres to supervise one another. 
Without intergovernmental supervision there is a danger of disintegration and 
fragmentation. However, the actual exercise of the supervisory powers could also 
have a negative effect. 
4  The cons of intergovernmental supervision 
Apart from the advantages of intergovernmental supervision, there are also factors 
that negate its good effects. Factionalism in the government sector, political 
considerations in intergovernmental supervision, consequences of the electoral 
system of government and concurrent distribution of powers to all the spheres of 
government weigh heavily against the achievement of effective intergovernmental 
supervision.  
 
                                                          
46  The preamble to the Constitution provides that the people of South Africa recognise the injustice of  
the past and draft the Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic, to heal divisions and 
establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; 
improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person. The view is 
reinforced in the judgment of Government of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 where it 
was held that the preamble of the Constitution shows that the people of South Africa are 
committed to the attainment of social justice and the improvement of the quality of life for 
everyone. 
47  s 10, 24, 26(1), 27 (1) and 28 (1) (c) of the Constitution. 
48  Grootboom case 40. 
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4.1 Factionalism in government sector  
Factionalism among the members of a political party is manifested in all spheres of 
government,49 and has a negative impact on intergovernmental supervision. The 
issue of factionalism arose in Mogalakwena Local Municipality v Provincial Executive 
Council, Limpopo.50 The case arose from disunity in the municipal council due to 
factionalism among ANC councillors. One faction of councillors was allied with the 
former mayor and the other with the municipal manager. The municipal manager 
instituted a forensic investigation that indicated that the former mayor and other 
councillors were corrupt.51 The municipal council made a resolution to appeal to the 
MEC for local government to remove the former mayor as a councillor. Subsequently 
the speaker of the municipality wrote to the MEC informing him of the council 
resolution and requested that the former mayor be removed as a councillor because 
he was implicated in the forensic report. The MEC responded by advising that the 
implicated councillor should be afforded the opportunity to state his side of the story 
regarding the alleged irregularities. The speaker then received notice from the MEC 
advising the municipality that the Provincial Executive Council of Limpopo had taken 
a decision to intervene in the Mogalakwena Local Municipality by assuming 
responsibility for a relevant obligation of the municipality. This action was based on 
the municipality’s alleged failure to fulfil its executive obligation in terms of the 
Constitution or legislation as reflected in the disunity that had prevailed among the 
councillors.52 The municipality sought an interim order interdicting the province from 
implementing the intervention pending an application for review of the provincial 
government decision. The court found the supervisory powers were used by the 
province against those whose political opponents were in power in the municipality.53 
In granting the interim order the court held that the provincial government’s 
failure to consult the affected councillors when taking the decision to intervene in the 
                                                          
49  Ilanga Newspaper (15-17 June 2015) “Divisions in the African National Congress”. 
50 Mogalakwena Local Municipality v Provincial Executive Council of Limpopo case no 35248/14 
(GPHC) (unreported) 400. 
51  Mogalakwena Local Municipality case 9. 
52  Mogalakwena Local Municipality case 1. 
53  Mogalakwena Local Municipality case 24. 
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municipality was at odds with the constitutional principle of cooperative government, 
which required all the spheres of government to cooperate with each other.54  
 
4.2 The consequences of party politics 
Political considerations impact on intergovernmental supervision when supervising 
spheres have interests in inter-political party disputes in other spheres of 
government. This is evident in the supervision of municipalities by provincial 
governments of a different political persuasion. In the case of Democratic Alliance 
Western Cape v Minister of Local Government Western Cape,55 the Western Cape 
minister for local government, led by the ANC, instituted an investigation into the 
affairs of Langeberg Municipality, led by the DA. The investigation was based on a 
DA decision to institute a disciplinary committee to investigate a councillor of the 
municipality – a DA member who at the time “crossed the floor” to the ANC in terms 
of the amended Schedule 6B of the Constitution. In setting aside the investigation 
the court found that it had been instituted improperly to look into the internal conduct 
of an opposition political party at local level.56 Thus intergovernmental supervision 
powers were used for political purposes on purely internal party matters.  
In City of Cape Town v Premier of the Western Cape,57 the local government 
minister and the Western Cape premier (whose provincial government was led by 
the ANC) decided to appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate the affairs of the 
City of Cape Town, based on allegations of irregularities during an investigation into 
the conduct of one of its councillors. The court found there was no merit in the 
provincial government’s investigation into the affairs of the city,58 and that the 
premier was influenced by political considerations when instituting the investigation 
so as to embarrass a political opponent, the mayor of Cape Town.59 
                                                          
54  Mogalakwena Local Municipality case 34. 
55 Democratic Alliance Western Cape v Minister for Local Government Western Cape 2005 (3) SA 
576 (C ). 
56  Democratic Alliance case 46. 
57  City of Cape Town v Premier of the Western Cape 2008 (6) SA 345 (C). 
58  City of Cape Town case 161. 
59 City of Cape Town case 162. Note that the Western Cape provincial government was led by the 
ANC while the City of Cape Town was led by the DA in 2008. 
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Inkatha Freedom Party v Abaqulusi Municipality involved the appointment of a 
municipal manager.60 The municipality was led by an ANC dominated coalition 
government when its executive committee recommended the candidate be employed 
in the position. The mayor, an ANC member, tabled an item recommending 
employment of the candidate. In addition, the mayor circulated an item stating that 
she had checked the candidate’s references and discovered that he was unsuitable 
for employment, since he had falsified his CV by indicating that he was employed as 
lecturer in local government studies by the University of Natal. She further reported 
that the reference check brought to light that the candidate’s former employer, 
Amajuba District Municipality, indicated that his performance as a municipal 
manager was poor and that he was on the verge of being charged for misconduct 
when he resigned. The deputy mayor, a member of the National Freedom Party 
(NFP), conducted his own reference check, finding that the municipal manager was 
indeed suitable for employment.61 At the next seating of the council the contradicting 
reports were discussed and the council, by majority vote, resolved to employ the 
municipal manager. The mayor then submitted the resolution of the council to 
employ the candidate to the MEC,62 who, relying on the mayor’s report, advised that 
the candidate should not be employed. The Inkatha Freedom Party  (first applicant) 
and the candidate (second applicant) resorted to court for a mandamus ordering the 
municipal council, executive committee and the MEC to implement the resolution of 
the municipal council in terms of which the second applicant was appointed 
municipal manager of the municipality. The mayor and the MEC opposed the 
application on the basis that the second applicant was not suitable for the position. 
However, the court found that the negative reference check regarding the second 
applicant was devoid of truth63 and that the council resolution employing the second 
                                                          
60 Inkatha Freedom Party v Abaqulusi Municipality case no 4539/13 (KZPHC) (unreported).  
61 Inkatha Freedom Party case 9. 
62 Note that the MEC is required to oversee whether the employment of a municipal manager 
complies with the law. Accordingly section 54 A (7) (a)-(b) of the Municipal Structures Act provides 
that the municipality must, within 14 days, inform the MEC for local government of the appointment 
process and outcome, as may be prescribed, and the MEC must within 14 days of receipt of the 
information on the employment of the municipal manager, submit a copy to the Minister; section 
54A (8) provides that if the person is appointed as municipal manager in contravention of this 
section, the MEC must within 14 days of receiving the information, take steps to enforce 
compliance by the municipality with the law, which may include an application to a court for 
declaratory order on the validity of the appointment, or any other legal action against the 
municipality. 
63  Inkatha Freedom Party case 16. 
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applicant was valid and binding.64 The respondents were ordered to implement the 
council resolution employing the defendant as a municipal manager.65 The MEC 
approached the High Court and obtained an interdict against the municipal council to 
prevent it from implementing the court order pending an appeal she intended to 
launch against the judgment.66 The MEC’s leave to appeal against the judgment was 
refused, as was her appeal to the Constitutional Court.67 
The case reveals how political considerations can negate the aim of 
intergovernmental supervision. The MEC’s determination to use tax money to take 
the case to the highest court on a matter that was already resolved by council after 
considering both reports on the suitability of the candidate for the position reflects 
that the supervision of the municipality was clouded by political interests on the part 
of the MEC. This observation equally applies to the case of Democratic Alliance 
Western Cape and City of Cape Town where political consideration was found to 
have clouded the supervisory power of the provincial government. 
4.3 The consequences of electoral systems of government 
In South Africa election to the National Assembly, provincial legislatures and 
municipal councils generally results in proportional representation.68 In respect of 
election to local government, provision is also made for ward representation in 
addition to proportional representation.69 Accordingly, local government elections 
result in a mixed system. This electoral system combines single-member 
constituencies based on simple plurality votes.70 The principle of proportional 
representation entails the division of seats and constituency according to the number 
of votes cast for party lists.71 Norris indicates that although the system of proportional 
                                                          
64  Inkatha Freedom Party case 25. 
65  Inkatha Freedom Party case 26. 
66 See case of MEC for KwaZulu-Natal of the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs v Inkatha Freedom Party case no 10304/13 (KZPHC) (unreported) 62. 
67  See Member of Executive Council for Cooperative Governance, Traditional Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal 
v Inkatha Freedom Party  case no 118/14 (CC) ( unreported) . 
68  Section 46 (1) (d) of the Constitution provides that election of National Assembly is in terms of 
electoral system, which generally results in proportional representation; section105 (1) (d) provides 
that election to provincial legislature is in terms of an electoral system that generally results in 
proportional representation and section 157 (3) provides that the election of a municipal council 
must be in terms of electoral systems that generally result in proportional representation. 
69  s 157 (4) (a) of the Constitution. 
70  See Norris 5. 
71 Norris “Choosing electoral systems: proportional, majoritarian and mixed systems” 18 (3) 1997 
International Political Science Review 5. 
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representation has advantages in accommodating minority parties in government, it 
produces indecisive outcomes and a lack of clear cut accountability and 
transparency in decision making.72 Given the nature of a proportional electoral 
system, the influence of political party caucuses on intergovernmental supervision 
could be huge, especially when the dominating political party in the sphere of 
government supervising another sphere is the same party that dominates in the 
National Council of Provinces (NCOP) and parliament. This view is supported by a 
case study showing that in all but one instance of provincial government intervention 
in local government, both the NCOP and cabinet member responsible for local 
government approved the interventions, even in instances where such interventions 
should not have been approved.73 Accordingly, the blind loyalty to a political party 
necessitated by this type of electoral system may lead to indecision by members of 
the reviewing functionaries, since, should they dissent from the caucus of the 
political party, they could be relieved of their posts with the legislatures at the 
discretion of the parties.74 
4.4   Consequences of concurrent distribution of powers 
Although the constitutional principle of cooperative government aims at harmonising 
cooperation and harnessing the functioning of government among the spheres, case 
law indicates that the exercise of concurrent government powers may evoke 
unhealthy competition among the spheres, negating this aim. Such competition is 
                                                          
72  See Norris 5. 
73  In the MEC of KwaZulu-Natal for Local Government, Housing and Traditional Affairs v Amajuba 
District Municipality 2011(1) SA 401 (SCA) the cabinet member responsible for local government 
was a member of the same political party as the party leading provincial government, which 
disapproved the decision of the provincial government to intervene by dissolving the Amajuba 
District Municipal Council, which was governed by coalition of political opponents. Further 
instances of interventions in local government are evident in Mnquma Local Municipality v Premier 
of the Eastern Cape 2011 (4) SA 44 (SCA); MEC for Local Government, Housing and Traditional 
Affairs v Utrecht Municipal Council 2007 (3) SA 436 (N); Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality 
v Chairperson North West Executive Committee case no 186/14 (CC) ( unreported) 31 . Apart from 
the Ngaka Modiri Molema case the NCOP and cabinet member could have reviewed and 
disapproved the interventions, which were carried contrary to the principle of legality. On the 
legality of intervention in Utrecht Municipal Council case, Mathenjwa (n5 above) 187 points out that 
that intervention might be illegal.   
74 See www.icol.co,za/news/politics/anc-members-face-internal-inquiry (29-06-15), which reinforces 
the expectation of blind loyalty to the decision of the causes from members of legislature under a 
proportional system of representation. The media reported on an MP of the ANC who objected to 
the adoption of the Protection of State Information Bill by abstaining from voting, irked the wrath of 
the party, and the party threatened to take disciplinary action against members who did not vote 
for the Bill. 
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apparent in the National Gambling Board v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal.75 The case 
involves competition between the KwaZulu-Natal premier and the minister of trade 
and industry over who should have the authority to control the central electronic 
monitoring system linking the gambling machines. The minister and the National 
Gambling Board contended that there should be a single central electronic 
monitoring system to which all gambling machines in the country should be linked 
and controlled by the National Gambling Board. On the other hand the premier 
contended that the provinces are entitled to their own electronic monitoring systems. 
This confusion arose from the provisions of section 44 (1) (a) (ii) read with section 
104 (1) (b) (i) read with Schedule 4 of the Constitution, which bestows on the 
national and provincial legislatures concurrent legislative competence to pass 
gambling laws.76 The board launched a court application for an order declaring that 
there may be only one central electronic monitoring system in the Republic. The 
Constitutional Court dismissed the matter because the parties had failed to comply 
with the principles of cooperative governance to try and solve intergovernmental 
dispute before litigating.77 
In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan v Gauteng Development Tribunal,78 the 
issue arose from competing legislation bestowing powers on both municipalities and 
the Provincial Development Tribunal to approve planning applications. The Town 
Planning and Townships Ordinance authorised the City of Johannesburg to consider 
applications for the rezoning of land and establishment of new townships within the 
area,79 whereas the Development Facilitation Act authorised the tribunal to consider 
applications for the rezoning of land and the establishment of new townships within 
the same area of jurisdiction. In approving a number of applications for land 
developments within the jurisdiction of the City of Johannesburg the tribunal failed to 
take into account the city’s development planning instruments and undermined the 
                                                          
75   National Gambling Board v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal 2002 (2) SA 715. 
76  National Gambling Board case 4; Schedule 4 Part A of the Constitution bestow on the national and 
provincial government, concurrent powers over trade; section 104 (1) (b) (i) afford provincial 
government the power to pass legislation for its province with regard to any matter within a 
functional area listed in Schedule 4 and section 44 (1) (a) (ii) confers on parliament the power to 
pass legislation with regard to any matter including a matter within a functional area listed in 
Schedule 4. 
77 National Gambling Board case 36. 
78  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 (6) SA 182. 
79  Town-Planning and Townships Ordinance 15 of 1986. 
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city’s development planning and its planning committee.80 The city launched a court 
application to obtain a declaratory order clarifying the powers of the tribunal under 
the Act. The court held that the Constitution confers “planning” on all spheres of 
government but municipal planning is allocated to the local sphere of government.81 
The court found that the provisions of the Development Facilitation Tribunal Act, 
which allows the Development Tribunal to exercise powers over municipal planning, 
were inconsistent with the Constitution.82       
In Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning, Western Cape v The Habitat Council: Minister of Local Government 
Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v City of Cape 
Town,83 the issue arose from the decision of the minister for local government in the 
Western Cape to decide on appeals regarding decisions by the City of Cape Town 
on planning-related matters and even replace the city’s decision with its own. Section 
44 of the Land Use Planning Ordinance (LUPO) allows the provincial government to 
hear appeals regarding planning decisions by the city. Acting in terms of this 
provision, the minister upheld the appeal against the decision of the city to refuse 
applications for rezoning and on another matter. The minister not only approved an 
appeal on rezoning, but also imposed his own conditions on the application.84 The 
city approached the court for an order declaring section 44 of LUPO unconstitutional. 
The court held that the power under which section 155(7) of the Constitution is 
bestowed on the national and provincial government, meant creating norms and 
guidelines for the exercise of power or the performance of a function, and not the 
usurpation of the power or performance of the functions as such. The court found 
that the constitutional scheme does not envisage the province employing appellate 
power over municipalities’ exercise of their planning functions.85  
                                                          
80  Gauteng Development Tribunal case 9. 
81  Gauteng Development Tribunal case 53. 
82  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010(6) SA 182 
(CC) 70. 
83  Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and development Planning, Western Cape v 
the Habitat Council: Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and development 
Planning, Western Cape v City of Cape Town  case no 117/13 (CC ) ( unreported). 
84  Habitat Council case 5. 
85  Habitat Council case 22. 
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In Minister of Police v Premier of the Western Cape86 the premier of the 
Western Cape, acting on community complaints about the ineffectiveness of the 
South African Police Services in the province, appointed a commission of inquiry to 
investigate such complaints. The commission was afforded the power to subpoena 
police officials to appear before it to account for the functioning of the police service. 
The premier exercised this power in terms of the provisions of the constitution, which 
entitle provinces to oversee the functioning of and appoint a commission of enquiry 
to investigate complaints against the police service.87 The national minister brought a 
court application for a restraining order to prevent the commission from issuing 
subpoenas to members of the police service, and direct it to suspend its activities 
pending a decision on review to set aside the premier’s decision to appoint the 
commission.88 The applicant based his application on the fact that policing was the 
functional arm of the national government.89 The court held that although policing is 
a national competence, the power afforded to the province to appoint the 
commission to inquire into police efficiency, impliedly includes the power to 
subpoena members of the police service to attend its hearings, testify before it and 
produce documents.90  
The Minister of Police case demonstrates that the national government could 
not monitor the provincial government in exercising its powers in monitoring the 
effectiveness of policing in the province if the national government competes for the 
exercise of such powers with the provincial government. 
                                                          
86  Minister of Police v Premier of the Western Cape 2014 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
87  Section 206 (3) of the constitution provides that each province is entitled to monitor police conduct; 
to oversee the effectiveness of the police service, including receiving reports on the police service; 
to promote good relations between the police and the community and to assess the effectiveness 
of visible policing with respect to crime and policing in the province. Section 206 (5) empowers 
provincial government to investigate, or appoint a commission of inquiry into, any complaints of 
police inefficiency or a breakdown in relations between the police and community. 
88  Minister of Police case 10. 
89  Minister of Police case 28. Note that section 199 (1) of the Constitution provides for a single police 
service made up of all the security services in the Republic. Accordingly provinces do not have 
their distinct police services. Furthermore, in terms of section 206 (1) the national minister is 
responsible for policing. However, in terms of section 206 (3) provinces are entitled to oversee the 
effectiveness of policing in their own areas. Schedule 4 part A of the Constitution allocates 
concurrent policing powers to the national and provincial governments to monitor the police 
service. Accordingly the effectiveness of the police service is a concurrent functional area of the 
national and provincial governments. 
90  Minister of Police case 57. 
16 
 
It is evident from case law that the conferring of concurrent powers without 
demarcating specific functional areas causes unhealthy competition among the 
various spheres of government and compromises the integrity of intergovernmental 
supervision. This occurs when the supervising sphere exercises instead of monitors 
the power that should be exercised by the other sphere. Thus the competition is 
likely to create tension, which might sour intergovernmental relations. This view is 
supported by a case study on the abuse of supervisory powers by provincial 
governments for crude and partisan reasons.91 The following section explores a 
mechanism to resolve intergovernmental disputes.  
5   Intergovernmental dispute resolution mechanism 
This discussion of case law indicates that intergovernmental disputes are inevitable 
in intergovernmental supervision. In anticipation of potential disputes the Constitution 
envisages national legislation to92 
“(a) establish or provide for structures and institutions to promote and facilitate 
intergovernmental relations; and 
(b) provide for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the 
intergovernmental disputes”. 
The IGRFA was passed to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations and to 
provide for mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the settlement of these 
disputes.93 Intergovernmental relations are defined as a “relationship that arises 
between different governments or between organs of state from different 
governments in the conduct of their affairs”.94 The Act provides for the establishment 
of intergovernmental structures to promote and facilitate these relations.95  
                                                          
91  See par 4.2 above. 
92   s 41 (2) of the Constitution. 
93  See n 3 above. 
94   s 1 (1) (g) of the IGRFA. 
95  Section 6 of IGRFA establishes the president’s coordinating council, which is a consultative forum 
for the president on matters of interest for provinces and local governments; section 9 makes 
provision for the establishment of a forum for a cabinet member to consult with MECs in the 
functional area for which the cabinet member is responsible and section 16 establishes the 
premier’s intergovernmental forum where the premier consults with the mayors of municipalities to 
discuss matters of mutual interest. 
17 
 
Intergovernmental disputes are defined as96 
“A dispute between different governments or between organs of state from 
different governments concerning a matter arising from - 
(i) a statutory power or function assigned to any of the parties; or 
(ii) an agreement between the parties regarding the implementation 
of a statutory power or function; and which is justiciable in a 
court of law”. 
The Act requires all organs of state to make reasonable efforts to avoid 
intergovernmental disputes.97 
However, not all intergovernmental disputes are resolved by mechanisms 
established under the IGRFA. Interventions by the national government in provincial 
government in terms of section 100 and by provincial government in local 
government in terms of section 139 of the Constitution are not included in the 
meaning of intergovernmental disputes.98 Accordingly, if a dispute arises between 
spheres of government over interventions among these spheres the dispute 
settlement mechanism provided for in the Act does not apply. 
Given the failure of IGRFA to provide for dispute resolution mechanisms to 
resolve intergovernmental intervention disputes, the Act might not adequately 
provide for an intergovernmental dispute resolution mechanism. This view is 
reinforced by Malherbe who criticises the Act for preserving national dominance over 
provincial and local government.99 Given the weakness of the Act in failing to provide 
for intergovernmental intervention dispute resolution mechanisms, the mechanism 
for review of intergovernmental intervention powers is explained. 
 
                                                          
96   s 1 (1) (c) of the Act. 
   97 Section 41 of the IGRFA allows the spheres of government and organs of state involved in 
intergovernmental disputes to declare them intergovernmental disputes. However section 41 (2) 
requires the organ of state to declare the intergovernmental dispute only if such organ of state had 
made reasonable effort to resolve the dispute. Section 42 requires the parties to convene a 
meeting between themselves to resolve the dispute once a formal dispute is declared.  
98  Section 39 (1)(b) of IGRFA provides that chapter 4 on settlement of intergovernmental disputes 
does not apply to a dispute concerning an intervention in terms of section 100 or 139 of the 
Constitution. 
99  Malherbe “Does the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005, confirm or suppress 
national dominance?” 2006 TSAR 810-818. 
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6   Review of intergovernmental interventions 
When provincial government intervenes in a municipality in terms of section 139 of 
the Constitution it must submit a written notice of the intervention to the cabinet 
member responsible for local government affairs and to the provincial legislature and 
NCOP.100 These functionaries have the power to review, set aside or confirm the 
intervention.101 This provision is congruent with the oversight responsibilities of the 
national government over the exercise of powers by provincial government. It should 
be noted that the constitution is silent on review mechanisms when the national 
executive intervenes in provincial government. As in the case of provincial 
government interventions in local government, national government interventions in 
provincial government should be reported to the NCOP and parliament. This view is 
congruent with the national executive’s duty to account to parliament.102 
The weakness in the supervisory role of the NCOP is that members of the 
council who participate in the decision of the provincial executive council to intervene 
in a municipality’s matters are the same members who sit on the NCOP and review 
its own decision of intervening in a municipal council.103 
Another weakness in the oversight of intergovernmental supervision is that the 
Constitution requires the intervening party to report intervention to other spheres of 
government. The Constitution is silent on whether the sphere of government that is a 
victim of an intervention can also report the intervention to the relevant functionaries 
for review. Accordingly, intergovernmental interventions may only be reviewed at the 
instance of the intervening sphere. 
The disadvantages of intergovernmental supervision show that the autonomy 
afforded to each of the spheres, and the good aim of intergovernmental supervision, 
are not decisive in achieving the goals of governance in the Republic, but that the 
actual practice of intergovernmental supervision power makes all the difference. 
                                                          
100   s 139 (2) (a) of the Constitution. 
101   s 139 (2) (b) of the Constitution. 
102  Section 92 (2) of the Constitution provides that members of Cabinet are accountable collectively 
and individually to parliament for exercising their powers and performing their functions. 
103 Section 60 (2) of the Constitution provides that NCOP is composed of ten delegates from each 
province, which include the premier of each province or his or her nominee. Also see section 125 
(1), which provides that the executive authority of the province is vested in the premier of that 




Rautenbach and Malherbe warn against over-reliance on words such as “spheres” in 
explaining the autonomy of government structures, and that it is not always the 
reference to “level” or “tiers” of government that reflects a hierarchical government 
structure, but the extent to which government authority is distributed.104 Thus the 
enshrinement of the principles of cooperative government in the Constitution is not 
decisive of good governance in the Republic, but it is the proper exercise of 
government powers and intergovernmental supervisory powers that will achieve 
such goals. 
7  Conclusion 
The discussion in this article shows that intergovernmental supervision is the most 
important mechanism for achieving the aim of governance in the Republic. However, 
the exercise of intergovernmental powers reflects patterns of hierarchical 
government structure in terms of which upper levels of government control the lower 
levels. This impedes the constitutional autonomy of the spheres of government, the 
practice of factionalism, political consideration, and the nature of the electoral 
system. Undemarcated concurrent distribution to and exercise of simultaneous 
powers by the spheres contribute hugely to national, and relatively to provincial, 
dominance in intergovernmental supervision. Although there are mechanisms in 
place for resolving intergovernmental disputes, they are weakened by the failure of 
IGRFA to include actions of intergovernmental interventions in such mechanisms. 
The reliability of the mechanisms to oversee and review intergovernmental 
interventions is compromised further by membership of the NCOP, where members 
who review the supervisory powers of provincial government are the same members 
who participate in decisions to intervene in local government in their capacity as 
members of the provincial executive. 
Based on these findings, it is recommended that the demarcation of functional 
areas for the different spheres should be established through national legislation. 
Such legislation would define and demarcate a specific responsibility for each of the 
spheres in concurrent functional areas. In this way the uncertainty that prevails with 
regard to areas of responsibility in the concurrent functional areas among the 
                                                          
104  Rautenbach and Malherbe Constitutional Law (2009) 93-94. 
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spheres would be obviated. If the recommendations are implemented, the reliability 
of intergovernmental supervision could be restored. 
 
 
